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1. INTRODUCTION
Recent high profile corporate scandals such as Parmalat, Société 
Générale, Lehman Brother or Bankia have eroded the public trust 
in corporate financial information, and called for legal improvements 
in the audit process (Palazuelos Cobo, Herrero Crespo, & Montoya 
del Corte, 2017). The role of the audit committee is particularly 
debated as an enhancer of more reliable financial statements. Most 
of the new legal rules have in common two basic characteristics of 
the audit committee: the members’ independence and professional 
competence. But, whereas the literature has provided abundant 
evidence on the positive effect of the audit committee independence, 
the qualification calls for further analyses (Monterrey & Sánchez, 
2008; Tepalagul & Lin, 2015).
The European Union regulatory framework on statutory audit 
(mainly Recommendation 2005/162/EC and Directive 2014/56/
EU) is an example of this new framework. The Directive 2014/56/
EU of the European Parliament on statutory audits acknowledges 
that audit committees play a decisive role in contributing to high-
quality statutory audits, and stresses the technical competence 
of the members as one of the most important requirements for the 
committee membership. The European Commission has not issued 
an explicit definition of audit committee member competence, but 
the legal framework mandates that directors on the audit committee 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
We analyze some personal characteristics of the members of the audit committee of the 
Spanish listed firms and the relation between these characteristics and earnings management. 
We find a non-linear relation with tenure, so that long tenures can initially compromise the 
directors’ independence but, after a given threshold, longer tenures improve the expertise of 
the members. Serving in too many boards has a negative influence on the ability of directors to 
detect earnings management, and higher academic background and more diverse professional 
background improve the directors’ abilities.
RESUMEN DEL ARTÍCULO
En el presente trabajo analizamos la relación entre algunas características personales de 
los miembros del comité de auditoría de las empresas cotizadas españolas y la gestión 
del resultado. Nuestros resultados muestran una relación no lineal con la antigüedad en el 
consejo: mientras que en los primeros estadios una mayor duración puede comprometer la 
independencia de los consejeros, llega un punto en el que la mayor antigüedad en el comité 
incrementa su experiencia. Formar parte de un número excesivo de consejos redunda en 
una menor capacidad de los consejeros para detectar la gestión del resultado. Una formación 
académica más elevada y una experiencia profesional más diversa contribuyen a mejorar la 
calidad de la información financiera.
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should possess expertise, and their dedication to the committee 
must be sufficient to develop their functions. In turn, the qualification 
of audit committee members seems to be related to two traits: their 
dedication and expertise. 
Regarding their dedication, the members of the audit committee 
are required to dedicate the time and attention necessary to fulfill 
their function. Recommendation 2005/162/CE states that members 
should limit the number of their other professional commitments, 
particularly directorships held in other companies, to assure the 
proper performance of their duties. This approach runs parallel to 
the concern of the European policy makers about the corporate 
governance framework (European Commission, 2011). 
Indeed, following the issuance of the Green Paper 
on corporate governance, in April 2011 the European 
Commission launched a public consultation and one of the 
questions dealt with a possible measure at EU level limiting 
the number of mandates a non-executive director may hold. 
As a proof of this concern, the European financial sector has 
been the first to incorporate some measures on the limitation 
of mandates (European Banking Authority & European 
Securities and Markets Authority, 2017; European Central 
Bank, 2017).
As far as the expertise of the audit committee is concerned, both 
the EU laws and the Spanish national regulation have paid special 
attention to this issue. First, the Directive 2014/56/EU of the 
European Parliament attempts to reinforce the technical competence 
of audit committees by requiring that at least one member of the 
committee is competent in auditing and/or accounting. Similarly, 
EU Recommendation 2005/162/EC mandates that the members of 
the audit committee should, collectively, have a recent and relevant 
background and experience in finance and accounting for listed 
companies appropriate to the company’s activities. 
The final disposition of the Law 22/2015 of Auditing has transposed 
these mandates into the Spanish regulation. In the same vein, the 
25th Recommendation of the Good Governance Code of Listed 
Companies (CNMV, 2015) and subsequently the Technical Guide on 
audit committees at public-interest entities (CNMV, 2017) demands 
that all members of the audit committee should be appointed with 
regard to their knowledge and experience in accounting or auditing. 
In this paper we use public sources of information to analyze the 
In this paper we use 
public sources of in-
formation to analyze 
the qualification and 
competence of the audit 
committee members of 
the Spanish listed firms.
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qualification and competence of the audit committee members of the 
Spanish listed firms. Our sample consists of 102 non-financial firms 
(293 firm-year-observations and 1,228 director-year observations) 
listed in the Mercado Continuo of the Spanish Stock Exchange 
between 2009 and 2013. Our research has two complementary 
aims. First, we report a descriptive analysis about the evolution 
of the committees’ qualification between 2009 and 2013 in Spain. 
We consider four dimensions of directors’ personal characteristics: 
tenure, directorships, academic studies, and, professional profile. 
Second, we study the relevance of these features to improve the 
quality of financial information. Thus, we examine whether there is 
an association between earnings management and some specific 
characteristics of audit committee members. 
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. Section 2 
discusses the theoretical arguments and develops our research 
questions. Section 3 sets out the empirical design and introduces 
the data and the empirical method. Section 4 presents the results. 
Finally, Section 5 concludes by summarizing the most important 
implications and suggesting some implications for managers and 
future research.
2. FINANCIAL INFORMATION QUALITY AND AUDIT COMMITTEE 
MEMBERS’ CHARACTERISTICS
To carry out their duties, the audit committee members are 
supposed to act independently and to have technical competence on 
accounting and auditing. Whereas directors’ independence can be 
quite clearly defined, the competence or qualification on accounting 
issues is not easily measured. Following the above mentioned 
European new framework on statutory audit and the recent Spanish 
legal reforms to adopt this framework, we posit that the qualification 
of audit committee members depends on three characteristics: their 
experience, dedication and expertise.
2.1. Committee members experience and earnings mana-
gement
Tenure within a firm enables directors to acquire a greater expertise, 
and develop important knowledge about the firm and its business en-
vironment. Effective monitoring is potentially an acquired skill, which 
suggests audit committees with long tenure can provide good moni-
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toring. Furthermore, seniority makes the directors more independent 
and less susceptible to top management pressures. Thus, committee 
members with longer tenure are likely to be more able to perform their 
tasks, which include the review of financial statements3.
Nevertheless, audit is an activity especially sensitive to the tenure, 
and too long tenures could be detrimental for audit quality (Ruiz Bar-
badillo, Gómez Aguilar, & Carrera Pena, 2009a, 2009b). In fact, both 
the European law (Regulation EU 537/2014 art. 17) and the Spanish 
Law 22/2015 of Auditing (art. 40) have placed a time limit for the ex-
ternal audit firm. Similarly, directors serving on the audit committee 
for too long periods could lose some independence. Vafeas (2003) 
proves this management-friendliness hypothesis and suggests that 
extended board service time makes committee members too close 
to managers at the expense of shareholders. Extended tenure can 
also reduce intragroup communications and thus lower the quality of 
monitoring decisions (Ben-Amar, Francoeur, Hafsi, & Labelle, 2013). 
Furthermore, committee members with very long tenures could be 
influenced by their own beliefs and schemes; in turn, their knowledge 
could eventually become a less valuable resource in the monitoring 
process. Consequently, the independent directors’ monitoring role 
is especially valuable when they have served long enough to learn 
about the firm but not too long to compromise their ability to monitor. 
According to these theoretical arguments we raise the question about 
the relation between audit committee members’ tenure and the quality 
of financial statements. Furthermore, we wonder our first research 
question: Can there be a non-linear relation between members’ tenu-
re and earnings management?
2.2. Dedication and earnings management
As previously stated, the number of directorships that a given director 
can hold is a matter of debate both from the policy-makers, the prac-
titioners, and the academia point of view (Habbash, Sindezingue, & 
Salama, 2013). Nevertheless, the answers have focused on the mem-
bers of the board, and we still lack of enough evidence for the audit 
committee. On the one hand, directors with multiple appointments may 
have richer experiences and connections, and provide access to more 
valuable resources (Sharma & Kuang, 2014). Moreover, an increase 
in the number of directorships enhances the reputation of directors. 
Nevertheless, the quality of directors with multiple appointments can 
be compromised when the number of their directorships is too high. 
CÉSAR ZARZA HERRANZ, FÉLIX J. LÓPEZ ITURRIAGA & NURIA REGUERA-ALVARADO
UNIVERSIA BUSINESS REVIEW | SECOND QUARTER 2018 | ISSN: 1698-5117
23
Serving on many boards can diminish the directors’ dedication as it 
can limit directors’ time, attention and preparation for board meetings, 
thus narrowing these directors’ ability to monitor (Baccouche, Hadri-
che, & Omri, 2013; Tanyi & Smith, 2015). 
In line with previous arguments, we consider a non-linear relation bet-
ween the qualification of audit committee members and multiple direc-
torships. Consequently, in a first stage the reputation effect has a high 
influence but there is a threshold after which committee members can 
be over-committed, so that the dedication effect prevails at too high 
level of directorships. In this sense, we propose the following research 
question: Is there any relation between multiple directorships and fi-
nancial information quality? 
2.3. Expertise and financial information quality
The abilities of the members of the audit committee to perform their 
duties can be a determinant of the quality of the audit process and, in 
turn, of the quality of the financial information (Badolato, Donelson, & 
Ege, 2014; Lee & Fargher, 2017). In this sense, the directors’ exper-
tise and knowledge are two key issues (Sultana & Mitchell Van der 
Zahn, 2015). 
Most of the definitions of a financial expert in the literature have in 
common the assumption that financial expertise can be gained 
through education or experience. Consequently, we focus on these 
two traits of the directors’ professional career, and analyze whether 
the members of the audit committee with wider professional expe-
rience or higher academic education can improve the quality of the 
financial information (Wang, Su, Wang, & Chen, 2017). Some authors 
have underlined the convenience of combining several sources of ex-
pertise (Dhaliwal, Naiker, & Navissi, 2010; Kusnadi, Leong, Suwardy, 
& Wang, 2016). From this point of view, our research question would 
be: Is there any relationship between directors’ professional or educa-
tional background and the quality of the financial information?
3. EMPIRICAL DESIGN
3.1. Sample
Our sample is made up of all the non-financial firms listed in the Spa-
nish Stock Exchange (Mercado Continuo) between 2009 and 2013. 
Then, we identify the audit committee members of these companies 
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and we look for information about their personal characteristics such 
as tenure as director, number of other directorships, age, etc. We drop 
out the firms that do not report enough information about the audit 
committee, which reduces the sample to 357 firm-year observations. 
The information about directors was mainly hand-collected from the 
Report of Corporate Governance that each firm must post on the 
firm’s website and submit to the Spanish Securities Exchange Com-
mission (Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores). If necessary, 
this information was complemented by looking at other public sources 
such as Bloomberg Business Week and the official websites of other 
companies where these directors served. We complete the director-
level information with firm-level financial information from Thomson 
ONE database. At the end of this process our sample consists of 102 
firms, 293 firm-year-observations and 1,228 director-year observa-
tions.
3.2. Method
The dependent variable of our study is the financial reporting quality. 
Since all of the proxies for earnings quality have at their core the re-
ported accrual-based earnings number, it makes sense to focus on 
earnings management (Parte Esteban & Gonzalo Angulo, 2008; Par-
te Esteban & Gonzalo Angulo, 2009). 
The literature has developed a number of accruals models with the 
aim of detecting the discretionary component of earnings manage-
ment. To determine which model has the smallest margin of error, we 
calculate discretionary accruals based on four different models: the 
Jones model, the Jones modified model, the Jones model adjusted to 
ROA, and the cash-flow model. The choice of the most suitable model 
is based on the tests of specification and power of each model. These 
tests inform about the ability of each model to avoid the so-called type 
I and type II errors. The specification test refers to the type I error, i.e., 
to consider as discretionary accruals some accruals which are not ac-
tually discretionary. On the contrary, the power test has to do with the 
ability of the models to avoid type II errors, namely not to detect some 
abnormal accruals4. According to these results, the Jones model ad-
justed to ROA performs better than the Jones model, and this latter 
better than the other models. 
Accordingly, we based on the Jones model adjusted to ROA to calcu-
late the variable DACC, which is the discretionary accruals. The ab-
normal or discretionary accruals have been calculated by estimating 
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cross-section regressions by year and sector, requiring at least six 
observations by year and industry5. 
3.3. Variables
To answer the research questions we consider three sets of 
directors’ characteristics: experience, dedication and expertise. 
Regarding the experience, directors’ tenure (TENURE) is calculated 
as the average number of years that members spend on a particular 
audit committee. To operationalize the dedication, in line with 
other studies, we consider busy members those who hold three or 
more board appointments. Thus, multiple directorships (BUSY) 
is calculated as the average number of busy members (Andres, 
van den Bongard, & Lehmann, 2013). As far as the expertise is 
concerned, we define four variables: first, the educational level 
of committee members (STUDIES) is measured as the proportion 
of members with postgraduate (either master or PhD) studies. 
Second, we compute the proportion of members with studies abroad 
(ABROAD). Third, after analyzing the professional experience 
of each director, we define four main profiles: politics, economics/
business, public administration, and university. Then, we define a 
dummy variable (PROFILE) which equals one when a director has 
simultaneously more than one category, and zero otherwise. This 
variable is a qualitative metric of the professional background, and 
complements the quantitative approach of the years of experience 
(TENURE). Finally, we also consider the proportion of foreign 
members (FOREIGN).
We introduce a set of variables due to their potential influence on 
financial reporting quality. First, two committee-related variables are 
included: audit committee size and audit committee independence. 
Audit committee size (ACSIZE) is measured by the total number 
of members on the committee. Audit committee independence 
(INDEP) is measured as the proportion of independent directors on 
the committee. In addition, two financial variables were added: firm 
size and leverage. Firm size (ASSET) is calculated as the log of total 
assets; and leverage (LEV) is measured by the ratio of total debt 
to total equity. Finally, we also use year and industry dummies to 
control both for time and industry effects. 
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4. RESULTS
4.1. Descriptive analysis
Table 1 displays the definition of the variables and some descriptive 
statistics for the main variables. On average, the directors’ tenure in 
a given committee is close to seven years (6.84) and the average 
proportion of busy members is around 33%. It means that one out 
of three members of the audit committees sits, on average, at two 
additional boards. The average of members with postgraduate 
education (master or PhD) is 44%, and the mean of committee 
members with more the one profile is 11%.
Table 1. Definition and descriptive statistics of the main variables
DESCRIPTION OF THE VARIABLES NO. OBS. MEAN STD. DEV. MEDIAN
DACC
Discretionary accruals using the model of Jones 
adjusted to ROA
293 0.011 0.014 0.008
TENURE Average number of years on the board 293 6.848 4.217 6.200
BUSY
Proportion of members with more than two 
outside directorships
293 0.332 0.279 0.333
STUDIES
Proportion of members with postgraduate 
studies
293 0.437 0.273 0.400
ABROAD Proportion of directors with studies abroad 293 0.075 0.163 0.000
PROFILE
Proportion of members with more than one 
professional profile
293 0.111 0.097 0.123
FOREIGN Proportion of foreign members 293 0.180 0.209 0.166
ACSIZE
Total number of members on the audit 
committee
293 3.734 1.039 3
INDEP
Proportion of independent members on the 
audit committee
293 0.959 0.106 1
ASSET Logarithm of total sales 293 21.188 1.927 21.200
LEV Ratio of total debt to total equity 293 3.228 3.249 2.143
Figure 1 displays the evolution of the members’ characteristics 
between 2009 and 2013 in order to provide a view of the recent 
evolution. Whereas in 2009 the average tenure was 5.76 years, it 
has increased steadily until 7.76 year in 2013. Thus, the members 
of the audit committee have longer and longer experience within 
the board. Whether it can have a positive or a negative influence on 
earnings management is an empirical issue that we will address.
CÉSAR ZARZA HERRANZ, FÉLIX J. LÓPEZ ITURRIAGA & NURIA REGUERA-ALVARADO
UNIVERSIA BUSINESS REVIEW | SECOND QUARTER 2018 | ISSN: 1698-5117
27
The proportion of busy members (i.e., the ones with three or more 
directorships), displayed in Figure 2, has also followed an upwards 
trend. This trend can be partially explained by the recent prominence 
of the financial experts, so that directors with this expertise are more 
solicited whereas the availability of such directors is not unlimited. 
This result is coherent with Jaafar, Wan-Hussin, and Bamahros 
(2016), who find that financial experts in the audit committee have 
more directorships than non-experts.
Figure 3 reports the proportion of members with postgraduate 
education. According to this graph, the proportion of committee 
members with master or PhD degrees has increased significantly 
between 2009 and 2013. A similar evolution can be found in Figure 4, 
concerning the proportion of members with more than one 
professional profile.
In figures 5 and 6 we report the proportion of foreign members and 
the proportion of Spanish members who have obtained an academic 
Figure 1. Tenure
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Figure 3. Studies
Figure 4. Profile
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7,0%
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15,2%
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42,51%
44,16%
43,60%
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degree abroad. It can be seen an upwards trend towards more 
internationalization of the audit committees. 
Taken together, the picture that emerges from illustrations 1 to 6 is 
that the audit committees of the Spanish listed firms have become 
more qualified in the recent years. Their members are credited as 
more experienced, with longer tenure in the board, more diverse 
professional background, and have higher academic education. 
In addition, an unneglectable proportion of them serve in several 
boards and there is an increasing internationalization trend, both 
in terms of foreign members and of Spaniards who have obtained 
their degrees abroad. The extent to which these characteristics can 
influence the tasks of the committee, i.e., the quality of the financial 
information will be analyzed in the next paragraphs. 
4.2. Explanatory analysis 
In Table 2 we report the panel data estimates of the regression 
between earnings management (DACC) and the characteristics of 
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the members of audit committees. We run four different models, 
and a joint model including all the independent variables. Model 1 
concerns the impact of committee members’ tenure on earnings 
management. Our results suggest a curvilinear inverted U-shaped 
relationship, according to which, for low levels of members’ tenure, 
discretionary accruals increase with tenure. On the contrary, after 
a given threshold, the relation turns into negative, so that longer-
tenured members reduce earnings management. As such, these 
results confirm both the friendliness and the experience hypotheses 
suggested by Vafeas (2003). Initially, members of the audit committee 
may become close to the managers and, thus, less independent 
and worse supervisors. This happens until a given point, after which 
seniority and long experience prevail over the acquaintance. 
In model 2 we study the effect of multiple directorships, i.e., 
whether busy members in the audit committee affect the earnings 
management. It can be seen that busy members have a positive 
effect on the discretionary accruals. In other words, our results 
Figure 5. Foreign members
Figure 6. : Studies abroad
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suggest that committee members holding too many mandates can 
have a negative influence on the quality of firm financial information. 
Consequently, these results support the dedication approach and 
refute the reputation approach. It means that members of the audit 
committee must have enough time to prepare for the task in order 
to give the governance the attention it deserves. This result is in 
line with the Recommendation 25 of the Spanish Good Governance 
Code of Listed Companies and the paragraph 24 of the Technical 
Guide on Audit Committees. Although the code recognizes that it 
is very difficult to specify directors’ dedication standards which can 
be recommended on a general basis, the firm should ensure that 
Table 2. Regression of directors’ expertise and financial reporting quality
VARIABLES MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5
TENURE 0.0021***
(2.7524)
0.0017**
(2.3970)
TENURE2 -0.0001**
(-2.4339)
-0.0001*
(-1.8627)
BUSY 0.0036*
(1.7149)
0.0035*
(1.6583)
PROFILE -0.0366*
(-1.8347)
0.0055
(0.7724)
FOREIGN -0.0075
(-1.0682)
0.0032
(0.4612)
STUDIES -0.0098**
(-2.2736)
-0.0074*
(-1.7385)
ABROAD 0.0053
(1.0670)
0.0024
(0.4776)
ACSIZE -0.0011
(-1.0579)
0.0010
(1.0464)
0.0006
(0.5677)
0.0001
(0.0982)
0.0005
(0.5203)
INDEP -0.0005
(-0.0437)
-0.0175*
(-1.6527)
-0.0095
(-0.7992)
-0.0028
(-0.2523)
-0.0102
(-0.9878)
LEVERAGE 0.0008**
(2.5570)
0.0001
(0.1739)
0.0010***
(2.8563)
-0.0000
(-0.0238)
-0.0000
(-0.0985)
ASSET -0.0008
(-0.9828)
-0.0003
(-0.3172)
-0.0004
(-0.3233)
-0.0004
(-0.4722)
-0.0005
(-0.6303)
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. observations 258 272 241 262 260
Adj.-R2 0.042 0.047 0.021 0.028 0.081
Estimated coefficients and (t-statistics). The dependent variable is the discretionary accruals (DACC) 
from the Jones model adjusted to ROA. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
CÉSAR ZARZA HERRANZ, FÉLIX J. LÓPEZ ITURRIAGA & NURIA REGUERA-ALVARADO
UNIVERSIA BUSINESS REVIEW | SECOND QUARTER 2018 | ISSN: 1698-5117
31
non-executive directors have sufficient time available to discharge 
their responsibilities effectively. In turn, the boards of directors are 
required to lay down the maximum number of company boards on 
which directors can serve.
In Model 3 we study the influence of the professional background. 
More specifically, we analyze whether having more than one 
professional profile (politics, economics/business, public 
administration, or university) or being a foreigner can be helpful skills 
in the audit committee. Although the foreign citizenship is not relevant, 
the coefficient of the PROFILE variable is statistically significant and 
negative, which means that members with a diversified professional 
experience can improve the quality of the financial information. 
This result is coherent with the Recommendation 14 of the above 
cited Spanish Good Governance Code of Listed Companies and 
paragraph 14 of the Technical Guide on Audit Committees, which 
mandate that the director selection policy should favor the diversity 
of knowledge and experience.  The result is also consistent with 
Dhaliwal et al. (2010) and Kusnadi et al. (2016) who show the 
importance of board members having mixed expertise in several 
areas.
Finally, we test the effect of the members’ academic background 
(STUDIES and ABROAD) in Model 4. Although ABROAD is not 
significant, we find a negative effect of the level of studies on earnings 
management, so that directors with higher educational level (either 
master or PhD degrees) in the audit committee have a significant 
influence in decreasing discretionary accruals. Consequently, the 
educational level of directors seems to be a relevant means to gain 
supervisory skills and to improve their role in the boardroom. 
As far as the control variables are concerned, the most significant 
result is the positive relation between financial leverage and earnings 
management. This result corroborates previous research and can be 
due to the relevance of financial information in the debt contracts 
covenants. In Model 5 we check the joint effect of all the variables. 
Results are coherent with the above explained ones. 
As a robustness test, in Table 3 we report the results of similar 
analyses when abnormal accruals are calculated using the Jones 
model. Broadly speaking the results are in the same line than those 
previously explained. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS
The recent legal impulse of the audit committee both in Spain and 
at the European Union level highlights the prominence that the 
members of this committee have for business and economic stability. 
Whereas the effect of the independence of the audit committee has 
been largely analyzed, the influence of the members’ qualification 
is a still relatively unexplored topic. In this paper we analyze the 
members’ experience measured by their tenure as director, their 
dedication measured by the number of other directorships held, 
and their professional and academic background measured by the 
professional profile and formal academic studies. 
Table 3. Regression of directors’ expertise and financial reporting quality
VARIABLES MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5
TENURE 0.0020**
(2.0115)
0.0018**
(2.1310)
TENURE2 -0.0001*
(-1.7935)
-0.0001*
(-1.9178)
BUSY 0.0065*
(1.9042)
0.0056**
(2.1964)
PROFILE 0.0171*
(1.6880)
0.0048
(0.5442)
FOREIGN 0.0070
(0.9313)
-0.0031
(-0.3677)
STUDIES -0.0054*
(-1.7199)
-0.0081*
(-1.6936)
ABROAD 0.0097*
(2.4953)
-0.0035
(0.5750)
ACSIZE 0.0013
(1.0127)
0.0019*
(1.7435)
0.0026**
(2.2058)
0.0010
(1.1356)
-0.0002
(-0.1447)
INDEP -0.0082
(-0.6510)
-0.0052
(-0.5636)
-0.0119
(-1.1956)
0.0023
(0.2896)
-0.0129
(-1.0200)
LEVERAGE 0.0000
(0.2411)
0.0000
(0.2311)
0.0000
(0.1138)
0.0000
(0.5569)
0.0000
(0.7674)
ASSET -0.0005
(-0.6397)
0.0004
(0.8689)
0.0002
(0.3040)
-0.0004
(-0.8146)
-0.0007
(-0.7270)
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. observations 300 266 254 253 255
Adj.-R2 0.062 0.062 0.079 0.112 0.057
Estimated coefficients and (t-statistics). The dependent variable is the discretionary accruals (DACC) 
from the Jones model.
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We manually collect the curriculum vitae of the audit committee 
members of 102 listed Spanish firms between 2009 and 2013, which 
means an analysis of 1,228 director-year observations. We find that 
some of these characteristics are significantly related to the earnings 
management. Our estimates suggest a non-linear relation with 
tenure, so that long tenures can initially compromise the directors’ 
independence but, after a given threshold, longer tenures improve 
the expertise of the members of the committee. We also find that 
serving in too many boards has a negative influence on the ability of 
directors to detect earnings management. Finally, higher academic 
and more diverse professional background improve the directors’ 
abilities, reinforcing the recommendation of the Spanish regulator in 
this sense. 
Our research can be interesting for a number of incumbents. First, for 
firms and practitioners, we provide some clues on the optimal design 
of the audit committee in order to reduce earnings management. 
Our results underline the relevance of the audit committee and 
confirms that the professional and academic characteristics of its 
members can affect the quality of the firm’s financial information. We 
show that firms must trade-off the advantages and disadvantages 
of long tenure in the committee, so that an optimal policy would 
be combining new members with long tenured ones. This policy of 
diversity also applies to the professional background since we find 
that combining members with different professional profiles improves 
the performance of the committee. Another implication of our study 
is that counting on committee members with too many outside 
directorships can impact negatively on the quality of the financial 
statements. 
For policy makers, our research joins the ongoing debate on the 
new regulatory framework of the corporate governance and the 
audit function. We show that the focus on the members’ competence 
is a step in the right direction, but new measures could be taken. 
We also shed some light on the debate about harmonizing across 
industries the limitation of multiple directorships given the recent 
recommendation of the European authorities for banks. We also 
contribute to the academia and other researchers by proposing some 
metrics of the directors’ expertise and extending our knowledge 
about the importance of committee members’ personal qualification. 
Our study suggests some avenues for future research. It would be 
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interesting to check the validity of our results in other countries, 
especially the EU members that are under the same European legal 
framework. In addition, more specific components of the directors’ 
expertise (for instance, accounting, audit, financial, or industry 
expertise) call for further attention. Finally, not all the directors play 
the same role within the committee (chairman, secretary, etc.). 
Forthcoming research could take into account these different roles. 
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